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Abstract 
In Book II of his epic romance The Faerie Queene (1590), Edmund Spenser narrates the 
journey of Guyon, the knight of Temperance, and his faithful Palmer, generally viewed as the 
external embodiment of Guyon’s Reason. In a close reading of the Palmer’s behavior, from his 
appearance at Gloriana’s court to his final destruction of the Bower, his flaws may be addressed 
and properly diagnosed as more than the obvious workings of righteous anger. Additionally, a 
faceted analysis of the Palmer allows for better distinction between the ideas that Spenser’s 
Humanistic influences and his Protestant leanings bring to his metaphorical table. 
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Spenser’s Palmer: The Perversion of Right Reason in The Faerie Queene 
 In Book II of his epic romance, The Faerie Queene, Edmund Spenser narrates the journey 
of Guyon, the knight of Temperance, and his faithful Palmer. As a sixteenth-century English 
writer, Spenser’s writing is inevitably influenced by Humanism and Protestantism and the 
allegorical implications that both of these schools of thought contribute. Spenser models The 
Faerie Queene after Aristotle’s Nichomachaen Ethics in which Aristotle lays out a plan for the 
ultimate acquisition of human happiness, or eudaimonia. This plan requires the development of 
various virtues, each of which Spenser purports to represent throughout his epic. Aristotle states 
that “virtue is a kind of mean, since…it aims at what is intermediate,” (ii.6.1106b.33-34) though 
it is only in Book II that Spenser introduces the concept of balance between two extremes—
excess and deficiency—which are always moderated by a central governing force of Temperance 
or Reason.
1
 Instances of this need for equilibrium regularly appear throughout the narrative of 
Book II, and within each is represented a desire, bordering on an obsession, to find a balance 
between the two temperaments.  
 As Guyon learns from the various situations that he encounters, the Palmer is necessary 
to his right understanding of the narrative world around him. Most scholars attribute this to 
Palmer’s representation as Reason, as much of his advice to Guyon and others whom they meet 
appears to serve as evidence for this distinction. Indeed, Maurice Evans goes so far as to call him 
“the power which God of his grace restored to Adam after the Fall, enabling him still to retain a 
glimpse of the divine truth” (89). His supposed direct connection to divinity is iterated by many 
Spenserian scholars; in regard to the Mammon incident, Rosemary Freeman asserts that “It is 
significant that the Palmer has been left waiting behind, for man cannot serve God and 
                                                 
1
 It is interesting to note the manner of description that Susanne L. Wofford gives to this situation as it is represented 
in The Faerie Queene. She asserts that “throughout the book we are in a place of dualities—no absolutes, no single 
one thing that sums everything up, but a constant balancing…to find the proper human place in the middle” (119). 
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Mammon” (129). Even Helen Cooney, who tries to discover a new realization of the Palmer, 
ultimately concludes that “the Palmer represents the virtue of Prudence” (Cooney 183). This 
idealization of the Palmer is so widely accepted that many scholars no longer attempt to address 
the Palmer’s character; any of his specific attributes are conveniently ignored in favor of his 
generalization as Reason. 
The prevailing opinion has long been that every interjection of the Palmer is uttered as a 
means of good influence. Though this cannot be wholly denied, it does not negate the fact that 
many actions undertaken for the greater good unintentionally, by their very nature, undermine 
the work attempted, a cogent example being the crusades of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth 
centuries. As such, this paper will attempt to recognize that if the Palmer is ultimately 
responsible for Guyon’s understanding of his surroundings, then the destruction of Acrasia’s 
Bower in Canto XII must also be attributed to his influence. While this destruction supposedly 
represents a cleansing experience similar to that of Jesus overturning the tables of the money 
changers in the temple in Matthew 21, there is a distinct component of irrational violence and 
anger to the proceedings as “all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace braue, / Guyon broke downe, 
with rigour pittilesse” (2.12.83.1-2). Nothing about their behavior is conducive to Temperance or 
Reason; the very use of the adjective “pittilesse” conveys a heartless and unabating anger, and 
prompts the reader to question how two characters meant to represent moderation and balance so 
quickly lose control.  
The necessity for and lack of balance appears in almost every situation where Guyon 
interacts with anyone outside of himself and the Palmer. It is missing in the figures of 
Cymochles and Pyrrhochles, who err on the side of excess in their dealings. Its absence is the 
cause of the deaths of Mordant and Amavia in Canto II, and it essentially defines Guyon’s 
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purpose and the reason for the quest that he and the Palmer are on. However, all confidence 
cannot be put on the logic of rational thought.  Judith Anderson asserts that “Guyon’s quest 
confronts the duality of a merely natural world and a world that is primarily rational: between the 
Palmer and Mordant and Amavia, there stands only Guyon…There is a balancing of alternatives, 
but no balance between them. Nothing quite unites these alternatives, and no principle quite 
holds this universe together” (161).  With the Palmer acting as an extreme rather than as a 
binding principle, his influence on Guyon cannot, by nature, be temperate. Anderson is one of 
the few critics who have thus far attempted to describe a problem with Guyon’s ethos; even as he 
develops Temperance with the Palmer for aid, he is torn between two extremes, and this affects 
his reading of every situation. 
While Guyon ultimately functions as an individual, it would be difficult not to see that 
much of the blame for his inability to fully engage in temperate behavior can be placed on the 
Palmer. Throughout the narrative, Guyon requires the interjections of the Palmer to properly read 
situations, such as the right identification of Redcrosse Knight in Canto I.   However, as is later 
seen in the capture of Acrasia, his status as a figure of right Reason is undermined, which 
eventually affects the reader’s view of his earlier actions. In a close reading of the Palmer’s 
behavior, from his appearance at Gloriana’s court to his final destruction of the Bower, his 
character flaws may be addressed and properly diagnosed as more than what most consider to be 
the obvious workings of righteous anger. In this way, a fuller understanding of his function in the 
story may develop, and he will receive not only an allegorical, but a human realization—without 
which many of his actions on Guyon’s behalf appear malicious rather than simply the result of 
faulty reasoning.  Additionally, a faceted analysis of the Palmer allows for better distinction 
between the ideas that Spenser’s Humanistic influences and his Protestant leanings bring to 
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Spenser’s metaphorical table, rendering the tensions between these two schools of thought more 
visibly traceable. 
Elucidating the Palmer’s Character 
 From the introduction of the Palmer’s reason for embarking on his journey, it becomes 
clear that his intentions stem more from anger than justice. His complaint to Gloriana 
necessitates the voyage that he and Guyon undertake throughout Book II; in Canto II, Guyon 
tells Medina the story of how the Palmer appeared at the Faerie Queene’s court and requested a 
knight to destroy Acrasia’s Bower. Spenser says that the Palmer “did complaine / Of grieuous 
mischiefs… / …and many whelmd in deadly paine, / Whereof he crau’d redresse” (Spenser, 
2.2.43.2-5). Within this passage, the Palmer shows not only a desire to right what he believes are 
wrongs done to people other than himself, but a propensity to vengeance. If one considers that 
redresse is “Reparation or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss,” (OED) Palmer’s 
craving for it is abnormal in that he has not been wronged, nor has he suffered a loss.  He craves 
redress even though there is no evidence that he has undergone any torment at the hands of 
Acrasia. Though the automatic interpretation of this behavior would attribute his seeming lack of 
self-interest to his godly origins, if one considers the significance of his title as Palmer and what 
that entails, this can hardly be the case. A Palmer is one who travels to the holy lands on a 
pilgrimage, although the OED gives another, more specific definition of a Palmer as “an itinerant 
monk travelling from shrine to shrine under a perpetual vow of poverty.” This calling is not 
entered into lightly, and entails much in the way of letting go of personal property, anger being 
as much a possession as the clothes on one’s back. In light of his vow of pilgrimage and poverty, 
it appears odd that he would not only abandon his quest for the sake of a complaint, but also that 
he would engage in such extreme behavior to manipulate the circumstances of Acrasia’s desired 
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destruction. His vengeful attitude is entirely outside of the calm reason that the reader has been 
instructed to expect from him. 
In order to critique the Palmer’s reason, a proper understanding of reason must be 
achieved. The OED records that as early as 1225, reason meant “The power of the mind to think 
and form valid judgements by a process of logic; the mental faculty which is used in adapting 
thought or action to some end; the guiding principle of the mind in the process of thinking.” In 
this sense then, the Palmer can be seen as Reason for he is a guiding principle, regardless of 
where he leads Guyon. In the philosophical sense, however, reason also means “A faculty 
transcending understanding, by which first principles are grasped a priori.” This reason is not 
learned over time in the manner of virtue; rather it is an ability that one should have from birth as 
a guide. Though Guyon has his “reason” for the entire journey, the Palmer’s ability to enact 
desirable behavior through logic is questionable.  What is undeniable, though is that the Palmer 
fails as reason because his actions cannot be “contrasted with will, imagination, passion” (OED); 
his distaste for Acrasia’s concupiscence is far more zealous than reasoned. Instead, the Palmer 
utilizes his ability to rationalize his passionate reactions and attempts to cast them in a more 
appropriate light of piety. Rather than relying ultimately on his Reason, the Palmer rationalizes 
to legitimize his behavior. Though reason does require a certain amount of rationalizing to 
strengthen an argument, the Palmer engages in such intense sermonizing that some critical 
attention has come to it. Judith Anderson points out that a comparison can be formed between 
the speeches of Braggadocchio and the Palmer. Though Braggadocchio hides in fear from 
Belpheobe he immediately afterwards asserts that he ran because she seemed “either hellish 
feends, or powres on hye,” (2.3.45.5) and that as soon as he realized who she was, he would have 
come forth. His excuses, Anderson argues, are very much in the same style as the Palmer’s 
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behavior in that the rationalization that the Palmer brings to his various encounters is given an 
extreme parody in the behavior of Braggadocchio: “That the Palmer's attitude and methods 
should be subjected to parody… suggests at least a potential weakness and a limitation in them” 
(165). It seems that Braggadocchio functions more as a foil for the Palmer than for Guyon, for 
even though he may represent misplaced chivalry, his propensity to “mythmaking”2 for his own 
gain and aggrandizement is similar to the moralizing in which the Palmer partakes. Just as 
Braggadocchio’s rationalizations are not sufficient to convince the reader that he is truly in 
control of himself and his surroundings, the Palmer’s sermonizing may not be enough to justify 
his actions as right. 
The Palmer appears particularly incompetent in the situation concerning Phaon,
3
 Furor, 
and Occasion and the deceit that the two use on Phaon to convince him of his wife’s infidelity. 
The Palmer’s dialogue suffers from a descriptive tone as he gives Phaon belated instruction on 
how to deal with the betrayal of his wife. “Wrath, gealosie, griefe, loue do thus expell: / wrath is 
a fire, and gealosie a weede / Griefe is a flood, and loue a monster fell” (2.4.35.1-3). While what 
he tells Phaon is, for the most part, true, it does not serve any real purpose. Phaon’s story is 
complete and so the Palmer’s admonitions are more akin to posturing than actual counsel, as the 
counsel hardly holds significance in the face of his imminent death. As one of the earliest 
instances of Reason gone astray, the Palmer here equates the intemperance of wrath and jealousy 
with love in its entirety, portraying it as a monster fell: “Fierce, savage; cruel, ruthless; dreadful, 
terrible” (OED). The argument holds very little substance because it offers no distinctions; the 
Love of God, which the Palmer must, by definition, hold dear, does not receive separate 
                                                 
2
 A term used by Anderson to describe Braggadocchio’s behavior in the aftermath of his interaction with Belphoebe 
in Canto III; he attempts to rationalize his fright by saying that he thought it was thunder. 
3
 In earlier editions of The Faerie Queene and in many journals and articles, this character is more commonly known 
as Phedon. 
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treatment. Particularly interesting is the manner in which he names love as the only antidote to 
Phaon’s trials in line 1, yet he immediately withdraws that view in line 3 for his monster 
metaphor.
4
 The Palmer offers no differentiation between the various and faceted types of love 
that exist, preferring instead to rail against what he sees as the inevitable result of feelings that 
rarely stem from reasonable emotions. His fear and distaste of concupiscence lead him to react 
irrationally to the stimulus of dying youth that Phaon embodies. Lauren Silberman, discussing 
the methods by which Temperance repeatedly fails in the narrative, posits that “The 
hermeneutical errors characteristic of Guyon and his mentor the Palmer result partly from an 
indiscriminate adherence to methodology but, more fundamentally, from prudishness that 
induces the drawing of rigid boundaries around the individual, boundaries that purport to exclude 
sense experience” (12). Their desire to experience everything through the ethical, though static, 
lens of Temperance precludes them from sufficiently engaging with each situation; rather than 
reacting to circumstances, they make futile attempts to force each situation into harmony with 
their preconceived and ill-applied notions.  Consequently, both the Palmer and Guyon consider 
abstinence from sensory stimulation as the epitome of reasonable behavior although they are in 
actuality positioning themselves at the opposite pole to sexual extravagance, extreme chastity.  
In his interactions with Phaedria, the Palmer shows another facet of his clearly troubled 
character. Early in Canto VI, she tempts Guyon away from the Palmer and on the journey to 
Acrasia’s Bower, the travelers once again come into contact with her. The Palmer’s response to 
this second meeting is nothing short of vitriolic. When she comes alongside their boat to engage 
the men onboard with her significant charms, “the Palmer gan full bitterly / Her to rebuke” 
(2.12.16.5-6). The bitterness of his response opens to the reader another facet of his character, for 
                                                 
4
 Upon close reading of the first line, the punctuation appears to indicate that the Palmer wants Phaon to exercise 
love in the face of danger, yet line 3 very clearly iterates an opposite idea. 
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it is more than stern reproof; it is “cruelly reproachful, stinging, cutting, harsh” (OED).  His 
rebuke is more than an admonishment against her sinful behavior; the anger behind it is severe 
and cruel, far from the satisfactory example of piety that he is meant to be representing. Again, 
her obvious sexuality represents a threat to the Palmer’s purposeful chastity; as such she and her 
attendant temptations require immediate expulsion. He lashes out at her because she is an 
impediment to his studied abstinence. In a chapter discussing Book II, “Sermon Parody and 
Discourses of the Flesh,” Richard Mallete asserts that the two temptresses offend the Palmer’s 
sensibilities concerning the flesh so intensely that he “exercises a curiously public homiletic 
role” (80). Rather than acting the guide to Guyon, the Palmer engages in sermon parody so as to 
shield himself from the immediate temptations facing him.  By enforcing his will over Acrasia’s 
actions, and in the destruction of the Bower that follows, the Palmer slowly subverts his purpose 
until his actions locate him so far from his righteous center that the restoration of balance 
becomes nigh on impossible. 
In naming Acrasia, derived from the Greek Akrasia meaning incontinence or weakness of 
will, Spenser attempts to position her as the obvious villain to Guyon’s hero. She does not 
deserve rehabilitation because, as Nigel Warburton reads Aristotle, this incontinence is entirely 
voluntary. As he states it, those involved in Akrasia “are overcome by their appetite and they 
succumb to the temptation of immediate pleasures rather than acting in a way that is conducive 
to long-term flourishing” (26). She is inherently against human life, and therefore is rightfully 
objectionable. However, the Palmer’s reaction to her is no more conducive to “flourishing” thank 
Acrasia’s, for rather than being the mean of continence, he moves to the other extreme; “the sort 
of man who takes less delight than he should in bodily things” as it were (vii.9.1151b.27-28). 
The continent man does not reject bodily pleasure, he merely moderates his enjoyment of them. 
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The culminating episode of Book II, then, results from the failure to correctly assert 
righteousness; in allowing himself to succumb to radical chastity rather than attaining the 
balance that he is said to represent, the Palmer no longer possesses the ability to properly judge 
and punish Acrasia’s offenses. In consequence, the destruction of Acrasia’s Bower results from 
the rage that the Palmer has been slowly fostering in himself and Guyon. Although all previous 
encounters have appeared to be leading to a final triumph of balance over excess, it is now clear 
that no earlier scenario truly resulted in a victory of Reason; that the Bower scene should suffer 
the same fate does not surprise. Immediately, the beauty of the Bower entrances the reader, 
though certain details appear to emphasize that “the process of exploring [the Bower] (and for 
the reader, of imagining it), must be similarly separate from the process of assessing it” 
(Mattison 85). 
 Spenser devotes three stanzas of Canto XII, 76-78, to describing Acrasia’s beauty, but he 
constantly reminds his readers that what they are seeing must not be desired: “Vpon a bed of 
Roses she was layd, / As faint through heat, or dight to pleasant sin” (2.12.77.1-2). The term 
“pleasant sin” beautifully shows that Spenser recognizes, and desires to emphasize, that sin often 
disguises itself as beauty. Conversely, the destruction of the Bower supposedly accentuates that 
proper action may not necessarily be beautiful, especially when it is the only mechanism to 
achieve the desired outcome. Unfortunately, the “means to an end” rationalization here 
inadequately satisfies the requirements of Reason. The Palmer’s “subtile net” serves to capture 
Acrasia, but her capture does not equate with overcoming temptation. Those who occupied the 
Bower with her “Fled all away for feare of fowler shame” (2.12.81.7); though they flee from the 
Bower, they are not inspired by “The painful emotion arising from the consciousness of 
something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one's own conduct or circumstances” 
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(OED) that constitutes shame. Instead of feeling this overwhelming shame as a consequence of 
their actions, they merely fear the shame that they would doubtless receive from being caught by 
the Palmer. This shame is not an internal feeling of repentance, its manifestation as public 
punishment represents a far greater threat to the captives.  Little attempt is made to rectify the 
wrongs of Acrasia; even though “Verdant…he soone untyde, / And counsel sage in steed thereof 
to him applyde” (2.12.82.8-9), Verdant is not penitent. Spenser says “Then led they her away, 
and eke that knight / They with them led, both sorrowful and sad” (2.12.84.1-2), and though the 
textual notes would assert that this sorrow is inward shame, it seems unlikely that one such as 
Acrasia, who is responsible for the deaths and transformations of many, would be chastened by 
one as apparently impotent as the Palmer.  
Having used her wiles to ensnare and transform many men into mindless beasts, their 
displeasure at her capture is surprising. That those whom she had transformed “fierce at them 
gan fly / As in their mistress reskew, whom they lad” (2.12.84.6-7) speaks volumes about her 
entrancing powers, because even when the Palmer transforms them back to their original form, 
they “stared ghastly, some for inward shame, / And some for wrath, to see their captiue Dame” 
(2.12.86.4-5). Her captives neither appreciate their change nor desire her capture, a response far 
removed from the thankful feelings one expects from converts who receive the “gospel truth.”  
Gryll, as the only man who refuses to be restored and who often receives the allegorical 
interpretation of the unrepentant sinner, becomes a spokesman for the rest of his fellow beasts. 
Although ultimately restored to his human form, he “Repyned greatly, and did miscall / That had 
from hoggish form him brought to naturall” (2.12.86.8-9). The Palmer merely glosses over his 
anger as the pining of an unredeemable sinner, but considering how closely it reflects the 
reactions of his fellow captives, though with words, the ideal religious transition never receives 
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suitable attention. The Palmer makes the mistake of assuming that the outward changes observed 
in the captives mirror some internal repentance.  No corrective measures are implemented to see 
that these enchanted men are converted to a proper way of thinking; they receive baptism 
without being taught the Bible. The Palmer’s objective is the capture of Acrasia, and now that it 
has reached completion, all that remains is to depart, “whilest wether serues and winde” (2.12. 
87.9). 
 While this overall view of the Palmer places him in a far from favorable light, it is not the 
desire of this paper to undermine the good that the Palmer does in augmenting Guyon’s point of 
view. It is obvious that Guyon learns greater Temperance from the Palmer’s advice—without the 
Palmer’s intercession he would have killed Redcrosse for the “greater good”—and this stems 
mainly from Guyon’s extreme deficiency as a reader. Therefore, it is not necessary that the 
Palmer be perfect in his teaching because his instructions to Guyon are preferable to Guyon’s 
utterly ignorant readings. Perhaps instead of representing the will of God as many critics suggest, 
the Palmer inadvertently begins to resemble the Church as an abstract, as well as Spenser’s 
internal clash between his education and his God. Not only does this leave room for error in his 
ways, but it leaves room for interpretation of his speeches in a more positive light than what has 
been discussed thus far. While Spenser’s God is always just in his dealings with humanity, 
centuries of evidence have shown that in times of necessity, the Church may turn to brute force 
to achieve its aim.  Righteous anger is God’s response to the Israelites’ golden calf in Exodus 32; 
though his anger burned against them, Moses—a mere human—convinced him to extend mercy 
to the Israelites, a cycle that is repeated many times in Exodus. Wrath as the Palmer engages 
with it is blind to its own shortcomings; his iconoclastic destruction of the Bower of Bliss does 
not leave room for mercy, nor does it seek to teach or learn from past failures. This iconoclasm is 
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characteristic of sixteenth-century Protestantism as it attempted to eradicate the influence of 
Mary Tudor and the Catholic Church from the social sphere. Spenser was complicit in this and 
he therefore cannot be objective in his desire to subdue all that is evil and wrong outside of his 
belief system. To expect him to do so would be to forget his humanity in light of his religiosity 
and to ignore the complex interplay between Reason and Faith endemic to the Protestant 
Reformation in England.  
Dueling Influences 
Spenser came of age in the years immediately following the Elizabethan Protestant 
settlement and as such it was a pervasive part of his life. The unrest characterizing the Tudor 
dynasty from Henry VIII’s creation of a separate church was finally coming to a close. Elizabeth 
succeeded in creating a religion that allowed for variety in methods of worship, as such the 
chance of dissent lessened considerably. By the time in which Spenser was writing The Faerie 
Queene, Calvinist theology had become the most widely accepted belief system. Ciaran Brady 
asserts that Spenser himself was “strongly Calvinist in his theology” though he was also 
apparently “with equal firmness, an Anglican in his ecclesiology” (21). This position was not 
uncommon, in fact it is almost exactly the religion that the Protestant Settlement was meant to 
create. William A. Clebsch discusses the feat of the settlement, stating that the compromise 
“achieved a comprehensive church at once loyally national, traditionally catholic, theologically 
humanistic, and doctrinally Protestant” (114). The settlement succeeded precisely because it was 
vague enough to make the average citizen happy, although those on either extreme felt the 
settlement to be a betrayal by the government. Nevertheless, it allowed for a more robust 
Protestant presence in England, and it created a universal policy of worship for the English 
populace. 
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Religion would naturally have been an important facet of Spenser’s education in just the 
same way that it pervaded every part of sixteenth century life. As such, it is not a surprise that his 
values were so firmly grounded within the biblical context; his grasp of biblical allusion 
hearkens to a long and thorough education in religion. His academic instruction was based firmly 
in the study of humanist texts, but it was also accompanied by a sincere discussion of Protestant 
values. As a child attending the Merchant Taylors’ School, he was educated in the classic 
literature that Humanists admire: Horace, Virgil, and Cicero, of course supplemented with 
education in Greek and Latin. However, under the auspices of his headmaster, Richard 
Mulcaster, he would also have frequently come into contact with Protestant writers such as Jan 
Van der Noodt whose books young Spenser contributed to and which discuss his strongly held 
beliefs. As John N. King states it, “Richard Mulcaster enjoyed a reputation both as an 
educational reformer and as a zealous Protestant ideologue” (200-201). According to William 
Oram, Richard Mulcaster was “a northerner educated at Oxford and Cambridge who later 
became important in London intellectual circles” (3), and as such “he could hardly have been 
better chosen as the teacher of England’s’ future epic poet” (2).5 Of course, church attendance 
was compulsory at the time, so Spenser could hardly have helped having a thorough knowledge 
of the scriptures. Indeed, King says that “in order to enroll as a poor student in Merchant 
Taylors’ School, young Spenser had to recite the catechism,” something that any youth in that 
religious climate should have been able to accomplish (200). 
As Mulcaster and Spenser show, the tension characterizing the early relationship between 
humanism and Protestantism had begun to fade. Erasmus himself, the pinnacle representative of 
humanist thought, was a proponent of a vernacular Bible for the English speaker. In the 
                                                 
5
 Most of Oram’s claims are suppositions, but it makes sense that a young Spenser would have admired and 
internalized the lessons he got from this apparent intellectual giant. 
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aftermath of the Catholic Church’s wanton destruction of English translation Bibles in 1526, 
Protestants and Biblical humanists joined together in rebellion against the Church’s policies. The 
Protestants interacted positively with the humanists in a number of ways; “The intellectual vigor 
and popular appeal of the learned transferred to the Protestants when, for example, Tyndale 
translated Erasmus’ Enchiridion of a Christian Knight, and [William] Roy conjoined Erasmus’ 
plea for the vernacular Bible with Luther’s attack on clerical celibacy” (Clebsch 118-119). The 
importance of correct and accurate translation was a part of both schools of thought; if one 
cannot learn in another language, learning must be accomplished by whatever method is 
available to the student. Therefore, the Catholic Church’s behavior would have been deeply 
offensive to those concerned. Protestantism took up the banner of publication to forward its aims 
and expose popery as false. Though some would object to what they viewed as a return to secular 
values, the emergence of Protestant poetics combined with painstaking research in the humanist 
tradition, finally resulted in the emergence of “an authentically Protestant literary culture” 
(Collinson 98).  
In Spenser’s time, Protestantism and Humanism were not mutually exclusive; even 
though this poem contains clear religious allegory, the Spenser Encyclopedia calls The Faerie 
Queene “the major poem of sixteenth-century English humanism.” However, this is not to say 
that tensions between the use of Reason as a way of understanding the world and knowledge of 
God as the supreme authority did not occur; some misalignment inevitably appears in the 
interaction of these two because of the belief systems that they encompass. Richard Halpern says 
that Humanism represented “a means of developing the expressiveness of the individual, or a 
sure road to cultural anarchy” (43). Essentially, the interpretation of the individual was of the 
utmost importance; only by interacting with the text on a personal level could knowledge be 
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acquired. Individual thought free of institutional indoctrination became the standard of true 
learning. In completely opposite fashion, biblical significance does not depend on the hearer; the 
gospel message represents absolute truth and its veracity does not depend on belief from any 
reader, though interpretations may differ. Biblical narrative takes into account human frailty and 
it assumes that complete understanding is impossible. Regardless, this did not stop those like 
Erasmus, Tyndale, and, of course, Spenser to work within both spheres simultaneously; it is 
entirely probable that this tension became a source of creative distinction for them. 
Although these authors were able to engage with both Humanism and Protestantism at 
once, the work of reconciling the two within the context of The Faerie Queene poses many 
difficulties. Though both ideologies are clearly present in the text, few critics of Book II attempt 
to discuss them because many problems arise upon close examination. If only Protestant 
influences are examined, they seem to interact in harmony; the same can be said for the classical 
influences. Yet when these influences are looked at in tandem, the allegory appears to break 
down because Guyon cannot be an allegorical figure at the same time as he is a rhetorical one. 
To clarify, the virtues that Spenser adopts from Aristotle are ethical while the Biblical virtues are 
moral; though Aristotle labels them as moral virtues, his description of their implementation does 
not stem from the Christian understanding of morality—as knowledge  of right and wrong. 
Aristotle’s moral virtues predicate on a constant movement toward eudaimonia, or happiness; by 
contrast, Christian morality is based on metaphysically grounded concept of right and wrong  
Though Spenser’s writing extended from his interaction with Aristotelian virtues, he never 
separates himself from the Christian tradition of moral virtue. On a certain level, Spenser cannot 
take a subjective view of his work in the Aristotelian tradition because his religious leanings do 
not allow for righteousness without morals.   
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The Nichomachean Ethics say that good works do not make one virtuous, rather “the 
agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have 
knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly 
his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (ii.4.1105b.3-4). As the 
evidence shows, neither Guyon nor the Palmer truly meet any of these criteria. Guyon suffers 
from an inability to gather knowledge by reading a situation; his actions at every turn result from 
the Palmer’s desires, and his propensity to get into trouble when left alone speaks volumes to his 
uncertain character. None of these circumstances satisfactorily show whether Guyon’s 
understanding of morality is equally at fault. Likewise, the Palmer suffers from a lack of 
comprehension, though his is far less noticeable. Yet still, the careful reader sees his failure to 
recognize the pertinent issues in the situations with Ruddymane and Phaon; his disregard for 
whether Acrasia’s captives experience true conversion shows a superficial view of the 
importance of righteousness. He chooses the voyage to Acrasia’s Bower but not from a 
disinterested desire for good; his appeal to Gloriana was for “redresse” (2.2.43.5) of the 
unmentioned wrong she apparently did to him. The situation clearly illustrates the impossibility 
of combining what supposedly operates as righteous anger in the capture of Acrasia with the 
reasoned behavior that Aristotle advocates. Forcing a reconciliation between the ideas appears 
futile in the aftermath of the Bower’s destruction. 
Rather than trying to make these views fit, examining them as separate entities and 
understanding why they are both present will be far more satisfying. In many ways, they do 
complement each other. The influences of Spenser’s Protestant background are deeply felt 
throughout Book II, although many scholars assert that Guyon’s story is dedicated more to 
classical influence than to religion. However, one must not assume that his humanist education 
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and his Protestant beliefs should be in absolute disagreement. As Patrick Collinson so aptly puts 
it, “The Faerie Queene is unmistakably a Protestent epic…With these poets the total 
incompatibility of Protestantism and high culture becomes more doubtful” (94). A major tenet 
that Protestantism and Humanism have in common, it is that one must be well read to succeed. 
Guyon begins the book as an incompetent reader, so in this respect, both schools work to 
improve his abilities. Spenser’s expert dialogue both with the Bible and classical scholarship 
allows the book to work ably within both spheres, although at times their inherent contradictions 
manifest in Guyon’s “body.” Guyon is both the teacher and the student; as an allegory he is 
flawed because he cannot act as the embodiment of a single idea, no matter Spenser’s intention. 
As a rhetorical figure, he strays too far from the temperate to be effective. He behaves more as a 
flawed human, regardless of his faerie origins; both ideals of perfection are outside of his reach. 
If Guyon must be allowed a modicum of imperfection, then surely the Palmer’s failures are even 
more understandable, for his origins are fallible and human. 
Only as a representative of humanity can the Palmer’s shortcomings be forgiven. Not 
only does Spenser’s human frailty need to be taken into account, but the Palmer’s humanity has 
also gone unrecognized thus far, and this is truly detrimental to the reading of his character. The 
Palmer is described as comely, yet he is still “clad in black attyre, / Of ripest yeares,” and his 
physical description gives him “heares all hoarie gray, / That with a staff his feeble steps did 
stire” (2.1.7.2-4). This man is old and delicate; his weakness is such that he lags far behind 
Guyon who is upon a horse. His black attire is formidable, yet his steps are feeble and slow; the 
Palmer has the sobriety to fulfill his purpose, but not the internal resources to do it correctly. The 
reader’s introduction to the Palmer is far different from the one that Spenser outlined in his letter 
to Raleigh, stating that “The second day ther came in a Palmer bearing an Infant with bloody 
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hands, whose Parents he complained to haue bene slayn by an Enchaunteresse called Acrasia: 
and therfore craued of the Faery Queene, to appoint him some knight, to performe that 
aduenture” (717). This account is much more satisfactory than the one that eventually became 
Canto XII because it allows the Palmer some justification in his behavior while creating a more 
heavy-handed crime for Acrasia than that of too much pleasure. In the final version, not only is 
the Palmer weak, but he is inconsistent.  
Aristotle’s Virtuous Man 
Spenser’s goal in this may have been to undermine his source material, Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics, to create a fallible paragon of Reason and thus assert the dominance of 
spiritual continence over human, and therefore flawed, continence. Aristotle’s concern in the 
Nichomachean Ethics is to outline the way in which the happiness of man can be attained. This 
happiness, or eudaimonia  represents the most desirable and ultimately satisfying lifestyle for 
man, “what we state the end of human affairs to be” (x.6.1176a.33) It is only through attaining 
the virtues that Aristotle discusses that man can reach this state of advanced actualization. These 
virtues are divided into moral and intellectual virtues, the distinction being that “intellectual 
virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching…while moral virtue comes 
about as a result of habit” (ii.1.1103a.14-15). Herein then, lies the reason for the underlying 
tension concerning Reason’s role in righteousness. Within the Letter to Raleigh, Spenser 
describes his work of allegory in the context of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics: “I labour to 
pourtraict in Arthure, before he was king, the image of a braue knight, perfected in the twelue 
priuate morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised” (715). Each of the books is meant to represent 
one of the twelve virtues mentioned in Aristotle’s work, although Spenser was only able to make 
it through six of those virtues fully. However, the virtues mentioned in the Ethics are “divided 
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into two main kinds, intellectual and moral,” (77) and Ernest Sirluck notes that while Spenser 
mainly discussed the moral virtues, his vision of the Palmer most closely represents the 
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (97), which would appear to value the intellect over 
morality. In the Palmer’s failure to properly enact Temperance in Guyon, then, Spenser 
undermines the intellects ability to be a moral guide. Aristotle’s Temperance is not easily 
swayed; it functions as a corrective mean between two undesirable limits. if the Palmer 
represents reason, he is unrepresented by the catalog of virtues. However, Ernest Sirluck posits 
that the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom adequately describes the Palmer’s “reasonable” 
role (97). If we take this assertion to be true, then the Palmer’s deficiency becomes perfectly 
intelligible, though perhaps not in the way which Sirluck intended. Practical wisdom cannot 
guide Guyon because, according to Aristotle, “it is of no use to those who have not virtue” 
(vi.12.1143b.33-34). Aristotle’s words imply that Guyon cannot properly learn his virtue because 
practical wisdom cannot teach; it is only useful to the one who already know good. The presence 
of wisdom is dependent on virtue, “for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical 
wisdom makes us take the right means” (vi.12.1144a.2-3). Without the virtue already in hand, 
the efforts of both are futile. 
Temperance, which Guyon should represent, is a moral virtue. According to Aristotle, it 
is entirely concerned with bodily pleasure, the pleasure of touch. As Guyon and the Palmer 
finally travel to the Bower of Bliss in Canto XII, they encounter various temptations that Guyon 
only resists by the help of his Palmer and the Palmer’s harsh rebuke of them. When Guyon 
comes across “wanton Maidens” (2.12.66.1) bathing and he “somewhat gan relent his earnest 
pace” (2.12.65.8) to join them , the Palmer immediately “much rebukt those wandring eyes of 
his, / And counseld well, him forward thence did draw” (2.12.69.2-3). Here, Guyon’s struggle to 
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attain Temperance is clear in his inability to resist the maidens on his own merit. Aristotle states 
that “the temperate man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant 
and at his abstinence from it” (iii.11.1119a.2-3), and Guyon’s wandering eyes show his inability 
to internalize his temperate education. Though this situation stems from Guyon’s lack of true 
Temperance in the face of sexual temptation
6
, it also represents an argument against the 
Palmer’s—or reason’s—ability to adequately react to moral situations. Perhaps then, Guyon’s 
character more closely embodies continence than temperance, for Aristotle says that “if 
continence involves having strong and bad appetites, the temperate man will not be continent nor 
the continent man temperate” (vii.2.1146a.5-6). If Guyon is striving for continence, his behavior 
and the Palmer’s presence are both justifiable because “the continent man, knowing that his 
appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them” (vii.1.1145b.7-8, 
emphasis added). The Palmer as his rational principle, his practical wisdom, turns him from the 
things that he desires, but cannot have. Only those who feel no temptation can experience 
temperance, and as shown in the above example, Guyon is not immune to the lure of bodily 
pleasure. 
An argument can be made that Spenser’s Reason fails because he is unable to truly 
reconcile Aristotle’s idea of Temperance and, peripherally, Reason with his own beliefs. R. 
Nevo, in his discussion of the Bower of Bliss, states that “In Spenser’s thought…is implicit the 
puritan suspicion of the works of nature” (39). While Nevo is here discussing simply the beauty 
of the Bower, this line of reasoning is still applicable to Spenser’s imagining of the entire 
episode of destruction. There is “a close parallel between the evils of the Bower and the evils 
attributed to the misuse of religious images” (Greenblatt 189) that colors the pure waters of 
                                                 
6This is an idea discussed in Syrithe Pugh’s “Ovid and the Limitations of Temperance in Book II of The Faerie 
Queene.”  
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Spenser’s reasoning; his suspicion of Catholic otherness and of the surreal beauty that they 
employ as a means of worship results in retaliatory iconoclasm that is not moderate, yet it is still 
satisfactory to slake the Palmer’s thirst for justice. This suspicion means that the objectivity and 
neutrality that characterized Aristotle’s virtues is missing from Spenser’s reasoning and 
therefore, his Reason.  
 The inescapably significant issue with the Palmer’s inadequacy is his seeming ignorance 
of any failure. As a paragon of righteous virtue, he becomes more a parody of righteousness than 
a proper example. Though it is rather unlikely that Spenser’s intentions were parodic, the Palmer 
nonetheless shines as an example of radical religion left unchallenged. In fact, though Spenser 
created him as a Protestant figure, the Palmer’s actions closely mirror the undiscerning violence 
that Spenser and his colleagues found so abhorrent in the Catholic Church and which the 
Protestants later reciprocated.  For the modern reader, the comparison immediately springs forth, 
especially in the retroactively informed light of England’s contentious, and violent, religious 
past. The mass killings of Catholics in Ireland—particularly endorsed by Spenser—, as well as 
the vicious expulsion of Catholics during the Civil War and Interregnum attest to the combative 
state of religious politics throughout British history. 
 In his own View of the Present State of Ireland, Spenser outlines a plan for the 
destruction of countless Irish in hopes that the rest of the people will convert out of fear. Spenser 
creates the characters of Irenius, a man well versed in the “degradations” of the Irish, and 
Eudoxus, to whom Irenius relays his opinions. The structure of the text works as a rhetorical 
outlet for Spenser to explain his ideas for reform, and though the reader is treated to two views of 
the topic, it is clear that Eudoxus’ ignorance of the true nature of the Irish make him incapable of 
properly judging the course of action needed against them. Irenius nonchalantly tells him of the 
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method of subjugation which he saw dispatched in The Second Desmond Rebellion of 1580 and 
which he believes should be once again forced on the Irish people: 
Although there should none of them fall by the sworde, nor be slaine by the soldyer, yet 
thus beinge kepte from manvrance, and there cattle from running abroad by this hard 
restraint they would quicklie consume them selues and devoure one another.Thee proof 
whereof I sawe suffycientlie ensampled in those late wars in Mounster, for 
notwithstandinge that the same was a mot ritch and plentifull Countrye, full of Corne and 
Cattell that yow would haue thought they would haue been hable to stande longe, yet err 
one yeare and a half, they were brought to such wretchednes, as that any stonie harte 
whould haue rewed the same, out of euerie Corner of the woodes & glennes they came 
crepinge forth vpon theire hands, for theire legges could not beare them, they looked 
Anotomies of death, they spake like ghostes cryinge out of their graues, they did eate of 
the dead Carrions, happye were they could fynde them, yea and one another soone after 
in so much as the verie Carcasses they spared not to scrape out of theire graues, and yf 
they founde a plot of water cresses or shamrocks, there they flocked as to a feast…in 
shorte space there were none almost left and a most populous and plentyfull Contrye 
suddenlie left voyde of man or beast, yet sure in all that war there perished not manye by 
the sworde, but all by the extremitye of famine, which they themselues had wrought.” 
(135). 
The images contained here describe a people absolutely destroyed by the hunger brought on by 
invading English, and yet Irenius, and consequently Spenser, sees no reason why the same 
should not be done to the Irish at large. The parallel between the inhumane desires listed here 
and the Palmer’s actions in the destruction of the Bower of Bliss cannot be ignored, nor are they 
coincidental. Clearly, Spenser believed that for the sake of civilizing those who wish to remain 
wild, even the most vicious action is acceptable. Though Ciaran Brady states that The View “was 
even then, as it has been since, a source of embarrassment” (25), the feelings that it evokes were 
nonetheless prevalent. In his use of force to assert the will of God, we see that Spenser’s active 
zeal is, in itself, not adequately temperate. If, as Sean Kane perceptively states, “a virtue rarely 
shines forth as a positive but instead is anonymously defined as a middle position between 
competing opposites” (59), Spenser’s Protestant ideology, in direct opposition to the Catholicism 
he distrusts, undermines his ability to direct the Palmer’s actions. Therefore, seeking to reconcile 
Temperate Reason and religious fervor in the figure of the Palmer represents as difficult a task as 
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the peaceful coexistence of Catholicism and Protestantism, a reality that Spenser could neither 
visualize nor desire. 
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